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CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OF A MINOR AS
A MATTER OF LAW IN MISSOURI
James W. Starnest
INTRODUCTION
With respect to the degree of care which must be exercised by a
child, for purposes of determining whether lie is guilty of negligence
or contributory negligence, the general rule is stated that he must
conform to that standard of conduct to be expected of a child of
similar age, experience and intelligence.2 While it may be said that
the courts of Missouri are generally in accord with this rule, the cases
have varied widely in the application thereof. As a matter of fact,
it has been admitted by the Supreme Court of Missouri that the
Missouri cases involving the issue of contributory negligence of a
minor as a matter of law "are in irreconcilable conflict. ' -2 With this
in mind, the maxim that each case must be decided upon its own facts
seems particularly appropriate to the determination of whether a
minor has, in a given case, been contributorily negligent as a matter
of law. However, to facilitate analysis of the Missouri cases, they
should be classified at least according to the general types of factual
situations involved therein. This article will attempt to make such
an analysis, and, to that end, -will be based upon a classification in-
volving the following four general categories: (1) Cases involving
minors who were injured in rail crossing accidents; (2) Attractive
nuisance cases; (3) Cases in which minors were injured as a result
of their employment, usually while operating machinery; and (4)
Cases where minors and adults were injured while in the attempt to
alight from public carriers.
It should be noted, in the consideration of this problem, that con-
tributory negligence is an affirmative defense, and that the rules are
rather stringent when this question is presented as a matter of law
t Member of the Missouri Bar; associated with Stinson, Mag, Thomson, Mc-
Evers & Fizzell, Kansas City, Mo.
1. Restatement, Torts §§ 464(2), 283, comment e (1934).
2. Cathey v. De Weese, 289 S.W.2d 51, 54 (Mo. 1956).
3. In Thompson v. Byers Transp. Co., 239 S.W.2d 498,-499-500 (Mo. 1951), it
was stated:
The burden of establishing plaintiff's contributory negligence falls upon
the defendant unless it be established as a matter of law by plaintiff's evi-
dence. With defendant carrying the burden of proof, plaintiff's contribu-
tory negligence most frequently is a fact issue for the jury for the credibility
of the witnesses is involved, especially where there is a conflict in the testi-
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This principle, when coupled with the rule that a minor is not bound
by the standards of conduct of the reasonably prudent adult, but
need exercise only that degree of care to be expected of children of
like age, intelligence and experience, seemingly could be used to con-
struct a strong argument in support of the position that the issue
whether a minor plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence is a
question for the jury and, therefore, not a matter subject to deter-
mination as a matter of law.
A. CASES INVOLVING MINORS WHO WERE INJURED IN
RAIL CROSSING ACCIDENTS.
Probably the oldest Missouri case involving the question of con-
tributory negligence of a minor as a matter of law was Berger v.
Missouri Pac. Ry.4 In this case, plaintiff, a nine year old boy, was
injured while attempting to climb between two cars of a train
stopped at a crossing and the train moved without warning. Plain-
tiff had been waiting for the crossing to be unblocked for about fifteen
minutes prior to his attempt to climb between the cars. A judgment
for plaintiff was affirmed by the Supreme Court of. Missouri, which
held that whether plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence was
a question for the jury. The court stated:
Common experience and observation teach us that due care on
the part of an infant does not require the judgment and thought-
fulness that would be expected of an adult person under the same
circumstances. In the conduct of a boy, we expect to find impul-
siveness, indiscretion and disregard of danger, and his capacity
is measured accordingly. A boy may have all the knowledge of
an adult respecting the dangers which will attend a particular
act, but at the same time he may not have the prudence, thought-
fulness and discretion to avoid them, which are possessed by the
ordinarily prudent adult person. Hence, the rule is believed to
be recognized in all the courts of the country, that a child is not
negligent if he exercises that degree of care which, under like
circumstances, would reasonably be expected of one of his years
and capacity. Whether he used such care in a particular case, is
a question for the jury.5
Notwithstanding the emphatic language of the Burger case, how-
ever, it was decided twenty years later, in Cherry v. St. Louis &
mony, the same as is defendant's actionable negligence ordinarily a fact
issue.... The whole evidence and all legitimate inferences deducible there-
from are viewed in the light more favorable to plaintiff and taken as true
while the evidence and inferences favorable to defendant are disregarded in
ruling the issue of contributory negligence as a matter of law.
See also Johnson v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 261 S.W.2d 95 (Mo. 1953).
4. 112 Mo. 238, 20 S.W. 439 (1892).
5. Id. at 249-50, 20 S.W. at 441. (Emphasis added.)
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S.F.R.R., upon virtually identical facts, that a thirteen year old
plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law.
While other grounds were also the basis for the reversal of the
judgment for plaintiff, the court stated that because plaintiff's testi-
mony indicated that he was as intelligent as any of the adult witnesses,
it was error to allow the jury to consider the plaintiff's age in passing
on the question of contributory negligence. That this decision is
erroneous seems too obvious for comment. The fact that plaintiff was
highly intelligent should not prevent his age from being considered,
inasmuch as experience and prudence are also factors involved in the
determination of the question whether due care was exercised.
In the case of Holmes v. Missouri Pac. Ry.,7 an action for wrongful
death, plaintiff's child, an eight year old boy, was struck and killed
as he ran across defendant's tracks at a crossing, without looking to
see if a train was approaching. Had he looked, he would have seen
the train at a distance of 500 to 700 feet. A judgment for defendant
was reversed upon the theory that the question whether the child was
contributorily negligent should not have been decided by the court
as a matter of law, but should have been submitted to the jury.
McGee v. Wabash R.R.,8 was a wrongful death action which in-
volved facts similar to those in the Holmes case. Plaintiff's thirteen
year old child was killed by defendant's train, which was traveling
in the country at a speed of 40 to 50 miles per hour. At a distance of
six feet from the crossing, an approaching train could be seen at a
distance of 40 to 100 feet. The boy was killed when he walked across
the track without looking for an approaching train. It was held that
the child was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law.
In Spillane v. Missouri Pac. Ry.,9 plaintiff, a boy eleven years of
age, was crossing a series of railroad tracks while dragging a piece
of ice which was tied to his arm with a length of string. Defendant's
train ran over the string causing plaintiff to be pulled against the
train and injured. Plaintiff had walked slowly across the track with-
out looking for an approaching train. It was held that a judgment
for defendant should be affirmed on the theory that plaintiff was
guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law.
Where a nine year old boy was killed by a street car when he darted
from behind another, it was held that a judgment for plaintiff should
be reversed for the reason that defendant was not negligent and that
the boy was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. 0
6. 163 Mo. App. 53, 145 S.W. 837 (1912).
7. 190 Mo. 98, 88 S.W. 623 (1905).
8. 214 Mo. 530, 114 S.W. 33 (1908).
9. 135 Mo. 414, 37 S.W. 198 (1896).
10. Battles v. United Rys., 178 Mo. App. 596, 161 S.W. 614 (1913).
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Thus, it appears that the Missouri cases involving the issue of a
minor's contributory negligence as a matter of law, when injured
as a result of a rail crossing accident, are in hopeless disagreement.
Either each group of opinions ignores the other, or the courts ap-
parently are able to distinguish the indistinguishable. Of the cases
discussed in this area, the oldest, Burger v. Missouri Pac. Ry., is the
most strongly written and, it is submitted, the most well reasoned.
The Cherry case is in conflict with Burger, and since the former was
decided by the appellate court, it cannot be considered as authoritative.
The Holmes and McGee case involved clearly analogous factual
situations. Actually the facts in the McGee case were more favorable
to the plaintiff than those in Holmes, yet in the former plaintiff's
conduct was held to constitute contributory negligence as a matter
of law, while in the latter the court allowed the issue to go to the jury.
Spillane v. Missouri Pac. Ry. is a strong opinion favoring a stringent
rule as to the measure of care required of a minor. The case of
Battles v. United Rys.'1 held that the plaintiff was guilty of con-
tributory negligence as a matter of law; however, this holding was
unnecessary to reach the result of the case since it clearly appeared
that there was no negligence on the part of the defendant. In the
light of the widely divergent attitudes expressed by these cases, the
conclusion seems unavoidable that the law of Missouri in this area
is at best unsettled.
B. ATTRACTIVE NUISANCE CASES
Hight v. American Bakery Co.12 was an action for damages by a
ten year old plaintiff who was injured when defendant's slowly
moving wagon ran over his arm while he reached to obtain one of a
number of toys thrown into the air by defendant's employees pur-
suant to an advertising campaign. In reversing a judgment for plain-
tiff the court stated that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negli-
gence as a matter of law because "he was old enough to know that if
he put his arm in front of a moving wheel and left it there, that
he was going to be hurt; he was of sufficient discretion to know
that. . . .1"2 However, it is to be noted that this appellate court
opinion also held 'that plaintiff had made no case of negligence on the
attractive nuisance theory. Since such a case appears to have been
clearly shown, and since the contributory negligence issue was treated
rather summarily-almost as an afterthought-at the end of the
opinion, it is submitted that this case is of doubtful authority.
11. Ibid.
12. 168 Mo. App. 431, 151 S.W. 776 (1912).
13. Id. at 460, 151 S.W. at 784.
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Daroren z. Kansas City" was a case in which the city was sued
for negligence in causing a pond to form by virtue of an earth fill, for
a street, across a ravine. Plaintiff's sons, one six years old and the
other seven months, were drowned when ice on the pond broke under
their weight while they were playing. A judgment for plaintiff, based
on the attractive nuisance theory, was affirmed by the Supreme Court
of Missouri.
The Da voren case was distinguished in Van Alst v. Kansas City1 5
on the theory that the issue of contributory negligence was not in-
volved in the Davoren case. In the Van Alst case, Kansas City had
constructed a sewer which acted as a dam and caused a pond to form
in an old creek bed. Plaintiff's son, an intelligent fourteen year old
boy, who had been warned by his father not to swim in the pond, was
drowned when he dived into the pond. A judgment for plaintiff was
reversed on the ground that plaintiff's son was guilty of contributory
negligence as a matter of law.
In Turner v. City of Moberly, ,' plaintiff's son, a fourteen year old
boy who was unable to swim, was drowned when he fell from a rope
which was attached to a tree and upon which he was swinging out
over a lake in a city park. In reversing a judgment for plaintiff on
the ground that he was contributorily negligent as a matter of law, the
court relied upon McGee v. Wabash R.R.,1 7 and also upon State ex
rel. Kansas City Light & Power Co. v. Trimble,", a case in which it
was held that a fourteen year old boy, who climbed an electric light
pole in order to attract the attention of some girl friends and was
electrocuted as a result, was guilty of contributory negligence as a
matter of law.
Henry v. Missouri Pac. Ry.,19 was a case in which a fourteen year
old plaintiff was injured when his leg was crushed between a railroad
turntable and a spur track. His leg was crushed while he was sitting
on the moving turntable and saw that he would be caught if he did
not remove his legs in time. it was held that since plaintiff knew of
the danger and of the likelihood of harm, he was guilty of contrib-
utory negligence as a matter of law, and therefore judgment for
plaintiff was reversed.
It is submitted that in these cases based on negligence for main-
tenance of an attractive nuisance, there is no logical support for
holding that the plaintiffs were guilty of contributory negligence as
14. 308 Mo. 513, 273 S.W. 401 (1925).
15. 239 Mo. App. 346, 186 S.W.2d 762 (1945).
16. 224 Mo. App. 683, 26 S.W.2d 997 (1930).
17. 214 Mo. 530, 114 S.W. 33 (1908).
18. 315 Mo. 32, 285 S.W. 455 (1926).
19. 141 Mo. App. 351, 125 S.W. 74 (1910).
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a matter of law. Further, it would seem that the doctrine of con-
tributory negligence is wholly inapplicable, and should not even be
an issue for the jury. The law imposes liability for the maintenance
of an attractive nuisance because of the likelihood that a child will
be attracted and hurt thereby because his tender years prevent him
from exercising that degree of prudence necessary to his well-being.
How can it be said that a child's action in diving into a pond, swing-
ing on a rope over a lake, playing on ice, or reaching under a wagon
to obtain a toy, constitutes contributory negligence which will bar
his recovery for damages from a defendant whose negligence consists
of creating or maintaining an unreasonable risk that harm will come
to some child attracted by the condition which constitutes that risk?
Since the very risk created by the defendant, viz., that some child
will be attracted and hurt, has caused the injury, it is untenable to
say that because the child was attracted and hurt by that condition
constituting an unreasonable risk of harm, he is guilty of contributory
negligence which will bar his recovery. The very purpose of the
attractive nuisance doctrine is to protect children from injury likely
to result from their own indiscretion. The more logical basis for
denying recovery, in those cases in which the court is of the opinion
that the minor plaintiff should not recover, is that the defendant
simply is not guilty of negligence, under the attractive nuisance doc-
trine, as to those children whose discretion is ordinarily sufficient to
prevent them from being attracted by the nuisance.
This rationale is also applicable in two analogous cases which in-
volved injury to minors as a result of handling explosives. In Shields
v. Costello,20 plaintiff, who was nearly twelve years old, was injured
when he exploded a dynamite cap which he had found on defendant's
premises. The court held that since plaintiff knew of the danger, that
dynamite caps would explode, he was contributorily negligent as a
matter of law. A later case, Lottes v. Pessina,2" has held that a plain-
tiff who was nearly thirteen years of age, and who was injured when
he removed and ignited powder found in paper tubes in a city park
subsequent to a fireworks display, was not guilty of contributory
negligence as a matter of law. Rather, the issue was a question for
the trier of fact.
In summation of the cases considered under this heading, two
considerations should be noted: (1) Those cases in which the plain-
tiff has been held contributorily negligent as a matter of law are based
on what is submitted to the faulty analysis; and (2) The only supreme
court case, Davoren v. Kansas City,2 held the defendant liable on the
20. 229 S.W. 411 (Mo. App. 1921).
21. 174 S.W.2d 893 (Mo. App. 1943).
22. 308 Mo. 513, 273 S.W. 401 (1925).
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attractive nuisance theory. While it is true that, as stated by the
court in Van Alst v. Kansas City,3 the issue of contributory negli-
gence was not expressly raised in the Davoren case, it is submitted
that the tenor, substance and spirit of the opinion indicate that con-
tributory negligence would not have been found as a matter of law.
C. CASES IN WHICH MINORS WERE INJURED AS A RESULT OF
THEIR EMPLOYMENT, USUALLY WHILE OPERATING MEACHINERY
In the recent case of Wilson v. White,4 plaintiff, who was thirteen
years, five and one-half months of age, while operating defendant's
lawn mower, was injured when the mower ran over his hand. De-
fendant had cautioned plaintiff generally to be careful and not to get
in front of the mower, but had not specifically warned him of its
tendency to creep forward. Plaintiff had operated similar mowers
previously. The court affirmed a judgment for plaintiff, holding that
he was not guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law when
he allowed the mower to creep forward and injure his hand. The
court stated that the question whether a minor was contributorily
negligent is usually for the jury, and that the question may be deter-
mined by the court, as a matter of law, only when reasonable minds
cannot differ as to plaintiff's negligence..25 The court quoted favor-
ably from Burger v. Missouri Pac. Ry.2G and stated in addition that
"the law recognizes that thoughtless conduct, impulsive action and
immature judgment are concomitants of youth ....
The most recent pronouncement of the Supreme Court of Missouri
on the subject of contributory negligence of minors apparently is in
Cathey v. De W1eese.2- In that case, plaintiff, who was seventeen years
and five months old, was injured when he attempted to free a tie arm
on a hay baler while the "power take-off" was engaged. His foot was
caught in the rollers, necessitating the amputation of one leg. Plain-
tiff had four years' experience as a farm hand, and had operated the
particular machine which caused his injury for about three weeks.
He had been warned by defendants, his employers, to be careful and
never to go onto the platform without first disengaging the "power
take-off." A verdict for plaintiff was reinstated, and a judgment for
defendant reversed on the theory that contributory negligence was
an issue for the jury. The court stated:
[Plaintiff's] awareness of some danger is not conclusive evidence
of contributory negligence.., and his testimony that he knew it
23. 239 Mo. App. 346, 186 S.W.2d 762 (1945).
24. 272 S.W2d I (Mo. App. 1954).
25. Id. at 7.
26. 112 Mo. 238, 20 S.W. 439 (1892).
27. 272 S.W. 2d at 7.
28. 289 S.W.2d 51 (Mo. 1956).
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was dangerous to come into contact with the rollers is not an
admission that he appreciated the hazard .... Not only must the
minor employee have had knowledge of the danger, it is essential
that he must have appreciated the hazard before it can confi-
dently be said that there could be no reasonable difference of
opinion as to the rashness and imprudence of his conduct.21
It is apparent that this case is powerful authority upon which to
base an argument that a minor plaintiff, in practically any given case,
was not guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. Under
the theory of Cathey v. De Weese, the issue in a case involving the
issue of contributory negligence of a minor as a matter of law is
whether plaintiff appreciated the danger of his action. Under this
doctrine, the fact that plaintiff was aware of some danger would not
be conclusive evidence that he appreciated the hazard. Just what
constitutes "appreciation" has not been defined by the Missouri courts.
However, the clear import of the Cathey case is that the question is
one for the consideration of a jury. The case constitutes a further
severe erosion upon the defense of contributory negligence and goes
far toward eliminating completely the application of the doctrine as
a matter of law.
In Stegmann v. Gerber-o it was held to be contributory negligence
as a matter of law where plaintiff, who was fifteen years and nine
months of age, and who had been through public school and had at-
tended a university for two years, was injured when he put his fingers
in the hopper of a sausage grinder. -
Boesel v. Wells Fargo & Co.31 was a case in which plaintiff, a girl
fourteen years, eight and one-half months old, was injured while
operating an elevator for her employer. She had placed her leg over
a safety bar on the elevator and left it there thinking that there was
sufficient clearance to allow the elevator to pass the second floor with-
out injury to her, when in fact the space was insufficient. This con-
duct was held to constitute contributory negligence as a matter of law.
In Marshall v. United Rys., -32 plaintiff, a boy fifteen years of age,
jumped down a dark elevator shaft in the mistaken belief that the
elevator was fourteen inches below floor level. Plaintiff had been led
to believe that the elevator was even with the floor level of a driveway
on the opposite side of the shaft because the doors were normally
closed when the elevator was not there, and because another emyloyee,
who was wearing a white shirt, was standing on a ledge in the dark-
ened shaft while attempting to open the driveway doors. A judgment
for plaintiff was affirmed in the appellate court but was reversed by
29. Id. at 56-57.
30. 146 Mlo. App. 104, 123 S.W. 1041 (1909).
31. 260 Mo. 463, 169 S.V. 110 (1914).
32. 184 S.W. 159 (31o. App. 1915).
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the supreme court" on the theory that this conduct constituted con-
tributory negligence as a matter of law.
While it is true that the Marshall and Boesel cases seem to represent
an attitude contrary to the theory advanced herein, it is to be noted
that these cases are readily distinguishable upon their facts, and
further that these cases are not of recent date.
Jackson v. Butler' was an action by a minor, who was betveen
the ages of seventeen and eighteen, for damages for personal injuries
caused by his employer's negligence for failure to provide a safe
place to work. Specifically, the negligence alleged was the mainte-
nance of faulty lockers which fell upon plaintiff and injured him. In
holding that it was a jury question whether plaintiff was guilty of
contributory negligence in failing to observe the dangerous condition
of the premises, the zourt stated that this omission would clearly
constitute contributory negligence on the part of an adult, but that
where a minor is involved, it becomes a question for the jury. The
court, quoting from Beven on Negligence,35 stated:
(a) An infant of the age of 14 years is presumed to have sufficient
capacity to be sensible of danger and to have power to avoid it,
and this presumption will stand till overthrown by clear proof
of the absence of such discretion. (b) An infant between the
age of ten and fourteen years must be shown to have capacity,
in the particular instance, to understand and avoid danger....
The measure of responsibility varies with each additional year.
It makes no sudden leap at the age of fourteen. That is simply
the convenient point at which the law, founded upon experience,
changes the presumption of capacity, and puts upon the infant
the burden of showing his personal want of the intelligence, pru-
dence, foresight or strength usual in those of such age.36
The court went on to say:
As the standard of care thus varies with the age, capacity and
experience of the child, it is usually, if not always, where the
child is not wholly irresponsible, a question of fact for the jury
whether a child exercised the ordinary care and prudence of a
child similarly situated . . . 7
The rule as to the presumptions involved in a case in which a minor
is charged with contributory negligence has been stated more suc-
cinctly as follows:
[T]he authorities appear to agree that after an infant has
reached the age of fourteen, there is no presumption that he is
33. 209 S.W. 931 (Mo. 1919).
34. 249 Mo. 342, 155 S.W. 1071 (1913).
35. See Beven, Negligence 40 (4th ed. 1928).
36. 249 Mo. at 370, 155 S.W. at 1079.
37. Id. at 372, 155 S.W. at 1080, quoting from Holmes v. Missouri Pac. Ry.,
190 Mo. 98, 106, 88 S.W. 623, 624-25 (1905).
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incapable of contributory negligence, and that in the absence of
proof to the contrary, the legal presumption is that such a child
is capable of being charged with contributory negligence ....
But ... the fact that a child has reached such an age as to be
deemed sui juris or capable of exercising care for his safety
does not necessarily mean that he is to be judged by the standard
of care required of an adult 38
The holding in Jackson v. Butler indicates at least an implicit adop-
tion of this statement of the law. In the language of the court, a
minor of the age of fourteen is presumed to have the capacity for
contributory negligence, but the court went on to hold that the plain-
tiff in that case, who was seventeen years old, was not guilty of con-
tributory negligence as a matter of law. Thus, any minor plaintiff
who is fourteen years of age would be rebuttably presumed to have
capacity for contributory negligence. But this does not mean that he
is to be held to the same standard of care required of an adult. The
question whether his conduct actually did constitute contributory
negligence, it is submitted, is a question for-the jury, under the doc-
trine of Cathey v. DeWeese.
D. CASES INVOLVING MINORS AND ADULTS INJURED IN THE
ATTEMPT TO ALIGHT FROM A PUBLIC CARRIER
Under this heading, the Missouri cases will be discussed so as to
indicate the general standards of care required on the part of persons
bringing suit against carriers for damages sustained in the attempt
to alight from the carrier's vehicle. The Missouri law in this area
will be discussed as it applies to the issue of contributory negligence
of a minor. While it is true that a carrier owes the highest practical
degree of care to its passengers, 40 it will be shown that this duty is
often in effect mitigated by the rules developed by the Missouri courts
in regard to contributory negligence.
Tillery v. Harvey,2 was a case in which plaintiff, a man old enough
to have two sons in World War I at the time of the trial, was injured
as he stepped from defendant's streetcar. The car was approaching
a regular stop at night, when the doors opened, and plaintiff, relying
on a custom of defendant not to open the doors until the car had
stopped, stepped out without looking to see if the car had stopped.
A judgment for plaintiff was affirmed on the ground that the issue of
contributory negligence was a proper question for the jury. The
court stated:
38. Annot., 174 A.L.R. 1080, 1145 (1948).
39. Roach v. Kansas City Rys., 228 S.W. 520 (Mo. App. 1920).
40. 214 S.W. 24G (Mo. App. 1919).
41. Id. at 24748.
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Plaintiff had a right to rely on the custom ... for the motor-
man not to open the exit doors for passengers to alight until the
car was brought to a full stop .... If the motorman opened the
exit doors, his action could not have been construed in any other
light than as a direction for passengers to alight then and there.
Plaintiff, in. the absence of anything to the contrary, had a right
to conclude that the car had stopped for the purpose of permit-
ting him to alight at that place....
It is apparent that plaintiff was relying implicitly upon the
duty of the motorman not to open the exit doors until the car
was brought to a stop, and that the plaintiff had his attention
more on whether the car was stopping at the usual stopping place
as he looked up Elmwood Avenue and saw the sidewalk. Whether
plaintiff should have taken any greater precaution to determine
whether the car had come to a full stop was a question for the
jury to decide. Defendants were under the duty to exercise the
highest degree of care to provide for plaintiff's safety. We can-
not say as a matter of law that plaintiff did not have the right to
rely entirely upon the motorman discharging his duty under the
circumstances. 42
The Tillery case is supported by Hibbler v. Kansas City Rys.,4" where
plaintiff was injured when she stepped out of the door of a moving
streetcar. It was dark and plaintiff thought the car had stopped.
Rules of defendant prohibited motormen from opening doors prior
to a complete stop of the car. Although a judgment for plaintiff was
reversed because of error in allowing certain damages not pleaded
to be proved, the court held that the issue of contributory negligence
was a question for the jury.
The Missouri law, as announced in the Tillery and Hibbler cases,
however, has been somewhat modified by subsequent cases. In Dele-
garder v. Wells,4 plaintiff stepped from the open doors of a moving
streetcar before it came to a regular stopping place. It was held that
plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law.
The court stated:
The opening of a vestibule door as a car is slackening its speed
and coming to a stop, but while moving very slowly, may well
constitute an invitation to a passenger to alight, and make the
question of his negligence in stepping from the car under such
circumstances one for the jury, if, on account of darkness or
other conditions, he is thereby misled, particularly i;here... the
passenger relies upon a custom to keep the door closed until the
car has stopped. But where, as here, it appears, without more,
that upon the opening of the car door the passenger stepped
from the moving car before it had reached or nearly reached
a stopping place, without taking any precaution to ascertain
42. 292 Mo. 14, 237 S.W. 1014 (1922).
43. 258 S.W. 7 (Mo. App. 1924).
44. Id- at 9.
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whether the car had stopped or had so slackened its speed as to
make it safe to alight, and when the motion of the car was such
as to be readily perceptible to one exercising ordinary care in
regard thereto, the passenger's injury thereby sustained must,
we think, be referred to his own negligence as being in law the
proximate cause thereof. 5
It may be said, with respect to the Delegarder case, however, that
such a result is not particularly surprising when it is considered that
no brief was submitted by plaintiff on the appeal.46
Simmons v. Wells,- involved a situation where the conductor of the
street car upon which plaintiff was riding announced a stop and
opened the doors. Plaintiff went to the door and stepped down onto
the step. He noticed that the car was still in motion, so he waited
for it to come to a stop. While he was standing there, the car made a
sudden jerk and he was thrown into the street. This was held to con-
stitute contributory negligence as a matter of law. The court stated:
Where it is the custom of the operator of street cars to not open
the door of a car until it has reached a regular stopping place
and come to a full stop, a passenger having no knowledge to the
contrary, and such lack of knowledge is due to darkness or other
conditions calculated to mislead him, may assume when the doors
are opened that the car has reached such a stopping place and has
stopped.... But to the passenger who knows, or in the exercise
of ordinary care would know, that the car is still in motion the
opening of the doors is not an invitation to alight, or even to
step dowm onto the step preparatory to alighting.8
In Kirby v. United Rys., 49 the conduct of an eighteen year old
girl, who stepped from a moving street car at night and was in-
jured when she fell from the car, which had stopped and had started
again, was held by a divided court to constitute contributory negli-
gence as a matter of law. This holding is suppoi'ted by the Delegarder
case and by Simmons v. Wells.
The rules established by the Delegarder, Simmons and Kirby cases,
however, are apparently mitigated with respect to their application
to cases involving minor plaintiffs by the case of Moeller v. United
Rys-50 In this case, plaintiff, a boy of twelve, was injured as he at-
tempted to alight from defendant's electric car, which was moving
"a little faster than a man ordinarily walks." Plaintiff stepped from
the car, which he was aware was moving, about three feet from the
end of the platform, and was carried over the end by momentum. It
was held that since the danger was not so obvious to one of his years
45. Ibid.
46. 323 Mo. 882, 20 S.W.2d 659 (1929).
47. Id. at 888, 20 S.W.2d at 661.
48. 242 S.W. 82 (Mo. 1922).
49. 242 Mo. 721, 147 S.W. 1009 (1912).
50. Id. at 729, 147 S.W. at 1017.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1959/iss3/3
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OF A MINOR
and experience to enable the court to say, as a matter of law, that he
must have seen and appreciated the danger, the question of his con-
tributory negligence was for the jury. The court stated:
The court cannot specify the age to which a child when he has
attained it shall be held as liable in such case as a person of full
maturity, because there are other facts to be taken into account:
the peculiar circumstances of the particular case, the knowledge
and experience of the child in reference to those circumstances,
and his capacity to appreciate the danger.,,
In this case, plaintiff was aware of the fact that the car was moving,
yet the court held that this did not mean that he saw and appreciated
the danger. This case would therefore seem to be strong authority for
the position that a minor plaintiff should be allowed to go to the
jury for the determination of the question whether his conduct con-
stituted contributory negligence, in a case involving a cause of action
for injuries received while alighting from a public carrier.
CONCLUSION
In summation, it must be reiterated that the Missouri cases on the
subject of contributory negligence of minors abound in confusion-
and this makes prediction somewhat hazardous. Apparently, no re-
ported case has been decided in Missouri since 1929 concerning the
issue of contributory negligence of passengers injured while attempt-
ing to alight from a carrier. The only Missouri case found which
involved the issue of contributory negligence of a minor injured while
alighting from a carrier is Moeller v. United Rys. The most recent
case decided by the Supreme Court of Missouri, witk respect to the
issue of contributory negligence of a minor as a matter of law, was
Cathey v. De Weese. This case is an extremely liberal one (par-
ticularly in view of the fact that the plaintiff was seventeen years old)
and indicates that' Missouri's modern judicial attitude may be some-
what less than entirely sympathetic to the defense of contributory
negligence, particularly where it is asserted against minors. The
next most recent Missouri case was Wilson tr. White, which also repre-
sents a favorable attitude toward a minor plaintiff's position in a
case involving the defense of contributory negligence as a matter of
law. While it must be admitted that the numerous cases- discussed
herein definitely point to inconclusiveness, it is submitted that the
present Missouri Supreme Court would allow the question whether a
minor plaintiff has been guilty of contributory negligence to go to
the jury in virtually every case- For practical purposes the defense
of contributory negligence of a minor as a matter of law has been
all but abrogated in .Iissouri and there is little likelihood that the
doctrine will be applied in the future except in extreme factual
situations.
Washington University Open Scholarship
CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS ISSUE
ALAN C. KOHN-Associated in the practice of law with Coburn &
Croft, St. Louis, Mo. A.B. 1953, LL.B. 1955, Washington University.
Law clerk to Mr. Justice Whittaker, Supreme Court of the United
States, 1957-58. Member of the Missouri Bar and the Bar of the
Supreme Court of the United States.
H. FRANK WAY-Assistant Professor in political science, Uni-
versity of California, Riverside. B.S. 1951, Northeast Missouri State
College; M.A. 1952, Oklahoma A. & M.; Ph.D. 1958, Cornell Uni-
versity.
JAMES W. STARNES-Associated in the practice of law with
Stinson, Mag, Thomson, McEvers & Fizzell, Kansas City, Mo. LL.B.
1957, Washington University. Member of the Missouri and Illinois
bars.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1959/iss3/3
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY
LAW QUARTERLY
Member, National Conference of Law Reviews
Volume 1959 June, 1959 Number 3
Edited by the Undergraduates of Washington University School of Law, St. Louis.
Published in February, April, June, and December at
Washington University, St. Louis, Mo.
JAMES E. CHERVrrz
M. PETER FISCHR
JEROME I. KASKOw
RoBEwT A. MIuIs
Associate Editor,
JACK R. CHArm
CR ALS C. ALLEN M
ROET L. AROKSOX
FjAWXX P. ASCHZMUr=
EDWAD BEUMOHa
G. A. BUDM JL
RCARD S. BULL
DORD . CARUTHERS
DAYS U. CoRwDLD
SAN RLScE
ARXTUR J. FRWVD
JoswX 3. GRLY..r
EDITORIAL BOARD
DoNALD L. GUNNELS
Editor-in-Chief
J.
B z E
BUSINESS STAFF
FACULTY ADVISOR
Hu"~a H. LxAx
ADVISORY BOARD
JOHN RAEBURN GREN
FoRnrsT M. Hm-m
GEORGx A. JrNSRII
LLOYD R. KOZNQ
ALAN C. KOHN
HARRY W. KnozOmx
FRED U KUHLAANN
WAREN . MATCHU.
DAVID L. MLLAz
Ross E. Monaza
RALPH I. NCUHO7
NoaRMAN PARKRZ
PETER SCHMInZ
mEALD TocKMAN
DWARD L. WELcH
Associate Editors
BURTON H. SHOSTAK
CHRISTIAN B. PZ1za
ORVILLE RICHARDSON(
W. MUNRO ROBERTS
STANLEY I5. ROaMMUM
A. E. S. ScL-mI
EDWIN 3L SCHAEr. JR.
GEORGE W. SIMPKINS
ICARL P. SPENCER
MAURICS . STEWAZP
JOHN . STOCK NA
WAYNA B. WuRoIH
Subscription Price $4.00; Per Current Copy $1.*25. A subscriber desiring to
discontinue his subscription should send notice to that effect. In the absence of
such notice, the subscription will be continued.
Washington University Open Scholarship
